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TYLER COWEN
Should Central Banks Target CPI Futures?
I consider recent proposals that the government should attempt to stabilize the nominal value of a CPI futures contract. Under a valiety of conditions arbitrageurs will break the peg and bankrupt the central bank, the central bank ends up in a gaming problem with private traders, or the regime collapses into discretion. SOME ECONOMISTS RECENTLY HAVE SUGGESTED that the central bank target a comprehensive futures price index. Under these proposals, the central bank would attempt to peg the nominal price of a CPI futures contract, and in doing so, would provide an anchor for the price level. When reduced to their fundamentals, explained in more detail below, these plans require the central bank to trade futures contracts with the private sector and thus to make cash bets on the future course of spot prices. These cash bets supposedly bind the central bank to achieving prespecified spot price targets and institute a regime of rules rather than discretion.
The idea of futures price targeting seems to have originated with Barro (1979) , although he does not advocate such a policy. Advocates of futures price targeting include Sumner (1989 Sumner ( , 1992 Sumner ( , 1995 , Glasner (1989) , Hetzel (1990) , Woolsey (1992 Woolsey ( , 1994 , Dowd (1994) , and Sumner and Woolsey (1995) . Closer to mainstream practice, central banks have been paying increasing attention to futures prices as indicators of inflation, even if they do not target such prices as a policy rule. l CPI futures price targeting attempts to circumvent the impact and measurement lags associated with stabilizing spot CPI prices. CPI futures prices react immediately to new inforrnation and can be read without delay (as we will see below, however, these advantages may be problematic). Sumner (1992, p. 491) notes: "the profession continues to advocate a wide variety of policy proposals that would appear to be dominated by index futures convertibility."2
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CPI futures targeting avoids some of the drawbacks of commodity bundle standards. Commodity bundle monies are limited to those few commodities that are easily deSned, homogeneous in quality, traded in highly liquid markets, and easily stored (Friedman 1951) . Futures targeting, in contrast, can cover the entire array of goods found in today's consumer price index without requiring direct convertibility.
The futures bundle can be highly diverse, and can measure actual purchasing power closely. The chosen index can include the prices of items that are illiquid or not easily stored, such as services and perishable commodities.
Following many futures contracts today, CPI futures would use "cash settlement." Rather than delivering the CPI bundle itself, traders would deliver a valueequivalent amount of cash, T-Bills, gold, or whatever other settlement asset is specified. The value of the futures contract, at expiration, is defined as equal to the value of the spot index. In this manner the futures contract can be settled without requiring actual delivery. In effect, futures contract traders are making cash bets on the future level of the CPI.3
In this essay I wish to flesh out the mechanics of futures price targeting. Specifically, plan proponents have not provided a systematic account of the arbitrage opportunities that private traders may hold against the central bank, and how the central bank must act to limit such opportunities. It turns out that futures price targeting is not sustainable under all conditions. I do not question whether price level stabilization is desirable, or whether the central bank should forsake monetary discretion. I take the implementation and goals of the plan as given, and consider whether the plan provides a feasible monetary regime. Section 1 describes the proposals in more detail. Section 2 presents the core of the critical analysis and considers the gaming problem between traders and the central bank, under a variety of assumptions. Section 3 considers whether the proposal dominates traditional spot price level targeting. Ongoing maintenance of the fututes peg implies that the bank periodically pegs 3. On the rich menu of contracts available with cash settlement, see Rubinstein (1989) . Yeager and Greenfield (1989) use cash settlement to support a commodity bundle unit of account, although they do not specify the inclusion of futures in the bundle. On indirect convertibility in commodity bundle systems, see Schnadt and Whittaker (1993) and Cowen and Kroszner (1994, chapter 3) . Barro (1979) seems to have traditional delivery-based commodity futures in mind for his peg; to that extent his plan does not stabilize the CPI. Webb (1988) provides evidence that commodity prices are relatively poor predictors of CPI inflation. 4. The central bank must promise to create new trading positions; buying and selling existing contracts does not suffice to peg the price. Buying a long position, for instance, need not push up the price of the contract, but only transfers the right to eventual settlement from one party to another. If the market for the contract is perfectly liquid, as in standard financial theory, the demand curve for the contract will be horizontal. Buying and selling already existing contracts will not influence market price at all. the level of spot CPI prices. The central bank will try to periodically (by each contract expiration) push spot prices to the prespecified level of the futures peg. Otherwise the futures contract, at expiration time, will be defined to equal some level other than the specified peg. (Cash settlement contracts require a definitional convergence of the futures price to the spot index, as explained above.) The maintenance of the first peg, the futures peg, therefore depends upon the success of the second peg, the periodic targeting of spot prices.
Although CPI futures targeting involves periodic attempts to peg spot prices, the futures component of the plan is not superfluous. First, the futures contract ostensibly creates a self-regulating money supply, based on market expectations about the forthcoming price level. Second, the presence of futures trading affects the incentives of the central bank. Both of these points will be discussed in further detail below.
CPI futures targeting does not require that market participants have an independent demand to trade futures based on a broad commodity bundle. Under the proposed regime the demand for contracts can be zero in equilibrium, that is, when the central bank is expected to meet its periodic price level target. The central bank announces a "ghost" futures peg and pegs the spot price level periodically to that same level. The spot price level peg insures determinacy, even if volume in the CPI futures market is zero.5
The CPI futures market plays a critical role when the expected future price level deviates from the announced peg. Net private sector demands for long or short positions arise when traders expect the bank to miss its spot price target in a particular direction. CPI futures trading will be motivated by arbitrage profit. Assume, for instance, that spot prices suddenly are expected to come in below the announced target at the time of contract expiration. The futures price is expected to fall in nominal value, and at the time of contract expiration the futures peg will be broken. Traders will demand short positions and the central bank must take the corresponding long position at the prespecified price. If the price level falls short of the target, the futures peg breaks at contract expiration and shorts make money at the expense of the central bank.
The converse case holds if traders expect the bank to produce a spot price level above the announced futures target. Traders will go long at the prespecified futures prices and the central bank will be required to take the corresponding short position.
If the spot price level comes in above the target, long positions will profit at the expense of shorts, as the futures contract rises in value at expiration.
Money Supply Mechanics
CPI futures targeting attempts to create a self-regulating money supply (Sumner 1989 , Dowd 1994 . Traders, when they contract short positions, receive due funds from the central bank immediately, thereby expanding the money supply. Similarly, 5. CPI futures contracts have been proposed numerous times by economists (for example, Friedman 1984), but have not caught on with market participants. Various attempts at CPI or inflation futures have been started and then abandoned for lack of trading interest. See Horrigan (1987) and "Price Index Fu-longs must make full immediate payments to the central bank, thereb the money supply. These changes in the money supply last until outstanding positions are settled, at which point the payments made at contract settlement reverse the initial contraction or expansion.6
According to plan proponents, market expectations determine changes in money supply growth and thus the price level. If traders believe that the bank is too tight with money (that is, the bank will undershoot the spot target), they will take short positions, causing the money supply to expand. If traders believe that the bank is too loose with money (that is, the bank will overshoot the target), the demand for long positions will cause the money supply to tighten. These expansions and contractions of the money supply continue until traders believe that the central bank is on target to achieve the prespecified price level. (Further below I argue that central bank discretion will in fact remain, but I am expositing the system as it has been proposed.)
The self-regulating money supply requires that the central bank be willing to take an unlimited number of either long or short positions. If the central bank limited the number of positions it was willing to take, private demands for long or short positions beyond that level would no longer call forth the appropriate money supply adjustments. Furthermore, without unlimited central bank willingness to trade contracts at the par price, the futures peg would collapse and the system could not meaningfully be described as CPI futures targeting. The central bank also would be vulnerable to speculative attack if traders knew that a temporary peg would not last.
CPI futures targeting attempts to bring the knowledge of the private sector to bear on price level targeting. If the private sector expects the bank to miss the target, the private sector trading behavior induces the money supply to expand or contract.
If the central bank unexpectedly misses the target the self-regulating money supply does not induce an adjustment, but neither can the private sector trade against the central bank for arbitrage profit (by definition the central bank "mistake" is unexpected).
The self-regulating money supply provides a corrective mechanism only if temporary increases (decreases) in the money supply do in fact induce inflationary (deflationary) pressures. According to Modigliani-Miller approaches to monetary theory, a temporary issue of new money, combined with a retirement obligation, places no upward pressure on the price level (Smith 1984 (Smith , 1988 . The issue of money is saved to pay off the future repurchase liability, as in Barro (1974) . CPI futures targeting requires that the traditional quantity theory, rather than the ModiglianiMiller approach, applies to this kind of "repurchase money."7
The postulated arbitrage equilibrium may be problematic for another reason as well. Even if traders expect spot prices to deviate from the announced target, they still may not perceive available arbitrage profits. When traders pursue arbitrage profits, they (collectively) prompt money supply changes that eliminate those profits. Even the first trader to take an initially favorable long or short position will earn 6. Sumner ( 1989) calls for expansionary open market operations to accompany private sector demand for short positions, rather than paying shorts immediately. This suggestion produces money supply behavior similar to the self-regulating case.
7. For some relevant defenses of the quantity theory, see McCallum (1983) , Hoover (1988) , and Cowen and Kroszner (1994, chapter 3). no profits, once other traders follow. Why, then, should any single apparent arbitrage opportunity?
When the costs of trading are zero, pursuing the apparent arbitra represent a Nash equilibrium. If no one pursues the profits, an indi by deviating and trading with the central bank. Equilibrium become atic, however, if we consider trading costs, even if they are small costs of trading potential arbitrageurs might stay away altogether, mixed strategy with some probability of trading against the central trade only when the potential arbitrage profits exceed the costs of t None of these strategies guarantees a self-regulating money supply duce the appropriate spot price level target. If all traders stay awa occurs at all. The mixed strategy equilibrium is sustainable only if tr expect some probability that arbitrage profits will not be competed aw probability that the self-regulating money supply will fail to work. Th at market levels (Dowd 1994, pp. 829-30) . Conversely, fees must be applied to short positions, otherwise the central bank would be offering unlimited loans at a zero nominal rate of interest.
The necessity for these payments and fees introduces an additional discretionary element to the system. The self-regulating money supply will depend not only on traders' expectations of the future price level, but also on the level of payments and fees set by the central bank. Only if these payments and fees exactly track market interest rates, after the appropriate adjustments for risk, can the central bank take a fully neutral position with regard to the money supply. More likely, the central bank would hold some discretionary power over these payments and fees, and would use that discretion to protect itself against successful private traders (more on this below).
ARBITRAGE AND GAMING PROBLEMS
Monetary policy typically operates with lags and does not deliver its full effec prices immediately. The presence of these lags creates a problem for CPI futu If traders can see that the CPI will come in low, they will have an unbounded demand to take short positions and the central bank will be required to take the corresponding long position. Once the CPI announcement arrives and the futures contract settles below par, all traders will gain at the expense of the central bank. The central bank either must declare bankruptcy or cease to operate the system.9
Traders may not always outguess the central bank, but traders need only catch a single (uncorrectable) central bank mistake for this problem to arise. By March 1 the bank must make a final stab at hitting the CPI measurement announced in September. After that point the central bank is vulnerable to the arbitrage activities of private traders.
To avoid this problem, the central bank might suspend contract trading once monetary policy can no longer influence the price level (Woolsey, personal correspondence) . In the example given we could assume the central bank suspends trading in the September contract on February 1. We are allowing the central bank to "move last" and to conduct its final and decisive acts of monetary policy while contract trading is suspended. 10 8. I specify these numbers for the purpose of constructing an example. A more realistic choice of parameter values would probably involve longer lags, but longer lags would not favor CPI futures targeting. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 31) , money has virtually no influence on prices for at least a year. 11. The reader may wonder whetherfuture contract cycles, after September, may constrain the behavior of the central bank in these periods. The role of these future contract cycles is analogous to the role of the September contract cycle in influencing the pre-February 1 period, which is discussed directly below. We can imagine a modified version of CPI futures targeting where the central bank faces additional constraints during these contract suspensions; the government, for instance, could impose a money supply or price rule on the bank. Three points then apply. First, the true constraints come from the supplementary rules and the policy regime should be evaluated as such. Second, overlapping contract cycles could make these supplemental rules perpetual rather than temporary. Third, CPI futures targeting presumably is motivated by the inadequacies of such rules.
vate sector expects to occur in February. The central bank will be looking at no more than the private sector's estimation of its own subsequent discretionary actions.
Alternatively, we might constrain central bank discretion by other means, such as by price or money supply rules. In this case the relevant stability comes from these external constraints, and not from CPI futures targeting. The case for maintaining CPI futures targeting is not strong. We could keep the external constraint to limit central bank discretion, and dispense with the complexities of CPI futures targeting.
The informational benefits of futures targeting could be reaped by indexed bonds, as discussed in the final section below. CPI futures targeting is motivated by the view that price level and money supply rules do not work well, but we cannot have it both ways. If such rules cannot halt discretion in normal circumstances they also cannot halt discretion when CPI futures trading is suspended. This alternative equilibrium does not eliminate the fundamental problems with CPI futures targeting. First, some lag will always remain, if only because of delays in reporting prices and constructing the CPI. The above arguments do not require any particular length of time for the monetary policy lag. Second, supply adjustments over short time horizons would bring considera volatility in real and nominal interest rates and in financial liquidity ously the idea of a volatile monetary policy with no lag Ot1 prices, t experience comparable short-run volatility in the price level as we fluctuating above and below the final target level before the onse expiration.
COMPARISON WITH STANDARD SPOT PRICE TARGETING
The problems faced by CPI futures price targeting exceed those faced by stand spot price targets. Standard price targeting allows that monetary policy may ha long and variable lags, and that the target will be achieved only roughly. The cen bank expects to miss the spot target by some amount, and faces no negative rep cussions from arbitrage in a futures market. Private traders cannot profit at the pense of the central bank, given that the central bank has made no commitment trade in CPI futures. 12 CPI futures targeting supposedly creates useful information about the futur course of the price level and applies financial incentives to the central bank, b upon closer examination neither mechanism works as promised. CPI futures, b creating a mechanism for bringing private information to bear on monetary poli also create a mechanism for the private sector to exploit central bank mistakes. T financial incentives of the central bank, rather than inducing price level stabiliz tion, instead give the bank an incentive to manipulate the expectations and trades the private sector, as discussed above.
Traditional spot price targeting can apply pecuniary incentives to the central bank if such incentives are found to be desirable. The central banker could receive a pay increase for hitting the appropriate target, the central banker could lose his or her job for missing the target (as in New Zealand), or the bank could be given a fixed nominal budget to discourage inflation. Each of these contracts applies incentives to the central bank without opening the bank up to unlimited arbitrage losses or giving the bank the power to manipulate private trading. 13
The informational advantages of CPI futures trading also can be replicated by less complicated and less precarious institutions. Indexed bonds, as we find in the United Kingdom and perhaps shortly in the United States, allow the central bank to capture the market's expectations of inflation, without creating the gaming and arbitrage problems involved with CPI futures targeting.
I do not intend these concluding remarks as a plea for spot price targeting or for indexed bonds. Spot price targeting and indexed bonds involve well-known costs 12. There is one case when private arbitrageurs might profitably trade against a central bank intent on stabilizing the price level. If real rates of return in the economy turn negative, the central bank is offering an asset, currency, with an above-market real rate of return. See Cowen and Kroszner (1994, chapter 3) .
13. See Cowen ( 1991) for a further consideration of such incentive contracts. and benefits, and I do not address the relevant debates in this paper. The weight of the arguments, however, does indicate that spot price targeting, combined with indexed bonds, dominates the CPI futures plan.
Implementation of CPI futures price targeting would most likely collapse into a regime of monetary policy discretion. First, the central bank holds considerable discretion once we allow for discretionary fee-setting (see section 1) and suspensions of contract trading (see section 2). Central bank discretion will increase even more if private traders treat contract trading as a gaming problem rather than as a straightforward equilibrating mechanism.
Second, if central bank mistakes are caught by the private sector, the central bank must sooner or later refuse to honor its futures contracts commitments. The bank, for instance, might adjustment settlement prices or its compensatory fees ex post to protect itself from trading losses. Over time regulatory conventions likely would evolve to limit the ability of private traders to trade with the bank, for the protection of both parties. CPI futures targeting, when viewed in this evolutionary perspective, still represents a viable policy option, but such a system would not eliminate monetary discretion or cure the perceived problems with current institutions.
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